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The last three decades have seen a resurgence of interest in the
tradition of political thought known as republicanism (or civic republicanism).' Works by Pocock, Bailyn, and Wood have recovered
the intellectual and social milieu of seventeenth and eighteenth century Anglo-American thought for modem political theorists.2 Indeed, the rise in historical and legal commentary on, and interest in,
republicanism has been so dramatic as to be called a "republican revival." 3 This renewed interest in republican thought has coincided
with a larger debate over the future of liberalism, which has been accused of ignoring important aspects of political life such as the need
for community4 or modem developments in psychology
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Modem elaborations of the republican tradition have attempted
to update its concerns for modem pluralist societies. In its concern
for shared values and emphasis on civic virtue, modem republicanism has some similarity with communitarianism, which has arisen in
the last several years as an intellectual alternative to liberalism!
Some thinkers, however, such as Cass Sunstein, see republicanism
within a larger theory that also embraces liberalism. Others, such as
Mark Tushnet, acknowledge that certain principles of republicanism,
such as "the common good," remain ill-defined. 8 Still other critics
contend that the values of republicanism are ill-suited to modem
sensibilities.!
The fundamental problem in finding contemporary relevance
for republicanism is the overly restrictive nature of republican principles as they have been traditionally expressed. As Philip Pettit
notes, almost from its inception republicanism was "an ideal for an
elite of propertied, mainstream males."'0 Similarly, the republican
preference for small, close-knit communities is at odds with the new
republicans' approval of geographically large and extremely diverse
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societies." The task for the new republican theorists, therefore, is to
"reappropriate [the republican] ideal and reintroduce it as a universal ideal for the members of a contemporary society." 12 Pettit's new
book on republicanism is an impressive effort in this process of reintroduction. Republicanism is part philosophical treatise and part policy guideline. Not only does Pettit develop a modem republicanism
and suggest its application to social policy, but he also includes a
"Propositional Summary" that tracks the argument contained in the
text, in outline form. This summary is helpful because the book introduces a number of specialized terms.
The political tradition Pettit draws upon has a rich history. Republican imagery and language, largely drawn from classical models,
were pervasive in the seventeenth and eighteenth century AngloAmerican world.13 Although republican writers used a constellation
of images and concepts to further their arguments, two have particular prominence. First was the belief that virtue, understood as the
sacrifice of individual interests to the polity as a whole, was the essential support for society. 4 The purpose of the state, in early formulations of republicanism, was to inculcate virtue into its citizens. Virtuous citizens would place the national interest before their own,
and the public good existed separately from the aggregate interests
of individual citizens."' This idea of the citizen had obvious connecn See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38

STAN.

L. REV. 29,

46-47 (1985). To accommodate these opposing viewpoints, some new republicans
have adopted the position of Madison, who thought that the goals of republicanism
(reduction of corruption, preservation of community values) could be preserved in
a large republic in which faction checked faction. See id. (arguing Madison and
other Federalists achieved a synthesis of republicanism with other values such as
pluralism).
12 Prrr,supra note 10, at 6; see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the
Claims of Community, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 685, 749-53 (1992) (claiming modem republicans have refashioned republicanism to make it more attractive); Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 30-31.
Is See generay M.N.S. SfELLES, AMEmCAN REPUBLCANISM (1994) (analyzing iconography and imagery reflecting American interpretations of classical republicanism).
14
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understanding of classical republicanism, see Bruce Frohnen, The Bases of Professional Raponsibility: Pluralismand Community in Early America, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REV.

931, 948 (1995) (arguing that virtue emerges from plurality of communities and

1997]

BOOK REVIEW

743

tions to classical political theory, in which political life and the pursuit of civic virtue, rather than protecting individual rights, were considered the highest callings. 6 A free citizen was one intimately involved in political life.
The republican ideal, therefore, was
extremely "public"-the fortunes and identity of the citizens were
closely tied to those of the republic itself.
Deliberation is a second central republican concept. A republican polity reached political decisions through a reasoned dialogue
among all its citizens, a process that should produce a solution that
represents the common good.' As corollaries to these principles,
the ideal republic in classical theory was comparatively compact in
territory and population, and citizens enjoyed relative equality of
condition."
A small and homogenous polity made deliberation
among the citizenry easier and the possibility of arriving at a reasonable and just decision more feasible.
The core republican ideal Pettit draws from his review of the republican tradition is the idea of freedom as "non-domination;" that
is, freedom consists in the absence of mastery by others. 8 Pettit argues, however, that this conception of freedom has been overshadowed by a series of thinkers who, for different reasons, mistook the
ideal of non-dominationfor the ideal of non-inteference, which Pettit
claims is distinct from and inferior to the republican vision of freedom.
This review is divided into three parts. Part I summarizes Pettit's analysis of the historical and theoretical underpinnings of republicanism, and Part II examines Pettit's application of republicanism to the modem state. Part III concludes with some final
comments on Pettit's proposals.
I
While republicanism does have a "distinctive historical provenance," Pettit contends that to remain viable as a political choice,

that the "people" modem republicans envision is a fiction).
16 See Isaac Kramnick, The "GreatNational Discussion": The Discourse of Politics
in
1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 4-5 (1988). But seeJohn 0. McGinnis, The PartialRepublican, 35 WM. & MAy L. Rzv. 1751, 1758-59 (1994) (arguing founders believed republicanism compatible with natural rights).
17 See Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalismt 98
YALE LJ. 449, 471-72 (1989); see also Sunstein, supranote 11, at 32.
is See Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought 29WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 57, 72 (1987).
See PErrT, supra note 10, at 22.
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republican thought must be reconstructed." He is not therefore
concerned with presenting a precise history of republican ideas.
Nevertheless, some historical background is necessary to demonstrate that the republican ideal is rooted in Anglo-American political
thought.
A.

HistoricalAntecedents

Before concluding that the republican understanding of freedom is one of non-domination, and before proceeding to the philosophical and political consequences of that conclusion, Pettit devotes a chapter to an historical survey of the republican tradition.
Republican thought began in ancient Rome, particularly in the work
of Cicero, and continued through the Renaissance in the writings of
Macchiavelli and in the political development of the Italian citystates.2 1 Its early modem exponents include James Harrington and,
more popularly, political writings like Cato's Letters or The Federalist.'
Although Pettit names James Madison as a republican proponent, it was the Anti-Federalists, the opponents of the new Constitution, who generally adopted republican reasoning." Based upon
their localist orientation, they perceived a national constitution as a
threat to the autonomy of the states and therefore to the rights of
citizens.24 The Anti-Federalists saw an intimate connection between
the extent of a republic and the moral rectitude of its citizens; the
extended commercial republic proposed in the Constitution threatened that vision." For a republic to function properly, they argued,
20 See id. at 10.
But see Barry Friedman, The Turn to History, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv.
928, 948-53 (1997) (disputing republicans' reliance upon history to support their
claims).
21 See id. at 17-50.
See id. at 20-21; see also Stephen A. Siegal, The Marshall Court and Republicanism,
67 TEx. L. Rzv. 903 (1989) (book review) (recounting history of republicanism).
23 See generally STEPHEN R. BOYD, THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION: ANTI-FEDERAISTS
AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONsTrTUON (1979); Gary L. McDowell, Federalism and
Civic Vwrtue: The Anti-Federalists and the Constitution, in How FEDERAL IS THE CONsmTruTON? 123 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1987).
24 See Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-FederalistNinth Amendment
and Its Implicationsfor
State ConstitutionalLaw, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1229, 1236-87; Jennifer Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Constitution, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 340, 345 (1982) (reviewing THE COMPLETE ANTi-FEDERALIS (HerbertJ. Storing
ed., 1981)).
See Essays of Brutus, I, in THE ANm-FEDERALST: W~rNGS BY THE OPPONENTS OF
THE CONSIUTrnION 108 (Herbert Storing ed., 1985) [hereinafter THE ANTIFEDERALIsrl. Some Anti-Federalists argued that large republics would prevent representatives from knowing or representing the sentiments of the people. When that
is the case, "the people do not govern, but the sovereignty is in a few." Id.; see also
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its members
must share the same "manners, sentiments and inter26
ests."
Madison thought these ideals were commendable but
"impracticable."' Madison is probably better characterized as a liberal or "pluralist," who sought to substitute the notion of faction for
republican virtue; his contention in The Federalist No. 10, for example, about the natural inequality of possession of property, would not
have found many sympathetic republican listeners. ' The Federalist
does echo some republican themes, such as the need for virtue, but
in strikingly different ways." Madison himself defined republican
governments as those that derived their powers from the consent of
the governed, and whose officers served for limited terms or during
good behavior.2 '
The writings of Thomas Hobbes mark a decisive shift in the republican understanding of freedom. Hobbes deflected the emphasis
in the republican tradition from non-domination to noninterference. In Leviathan and elsewhere, Hobbes took issue with
the republican belief that the rule of law was consistent with freedom."1 Republicans had argued that the rule of law is a condition of
freedom and that to protect liberty a civil society required a system of
law. Pettit calls this the "law-and-liberty" theme of republicanism.32
Of course, laws interfere with freedom, but, when carefully constructed, they can do so in a non-arbitrary manner. The subjects of
the interference have the ability to control the law, and republican
legal systems will have structural safeguards to protect against arbitrariness. Hobbes argued instead that freedom consisted in freedom
from coercion (i.e., interference) of any sort. As law, even republican law, was a form of coercion, by necessity it was a coercive restraint upon freedom." Hobbes needed to break down the concepLetters of Agrippa, IV, in THE ANTI-FEDERAU, supra, at 285.
Esays of Brutus, I, in THE Arm-FEDERAUsT, supra note 25, at 114.
7 See THE FEDERALIsT No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Of course, the Federalists were just as influenced by the republican tradition
as the And-Federalists. See genera/!y JOSEPH P. VrraRrrrl AND GERALD J. Russa.Lo,
Community and American Federalism: Images Romantic and Rea, 4 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
683 (1997).
28

See THE FEDERAIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 46-48.
" See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 42.
so See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
31 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 262 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968).
32 See PETrr, supra note 10, at 35.
S3 See id. at 37-39.
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tual barrier between "free" and "unfree" legal systems in order to
support his general argument for authoritarian government.'
Although opposed to the main tradition of republicanism, freedom as non-interference came to be associated with republicanism
through a series of writers who opposed the American Revolution.
Like Hobbes, the pro-British partisans had to advocate that there was
no difference, in terms of liberty, between the colonial governments
and republics. If all law was coercive, and the only true freedom an
absence of law, the colonists would be no better off under their own
legislatures than they were under parliamentary rule.-"
Although Jeremy Bentham did much to make this view of freedom respectable, Pettit places the blame upon Isaiah Berlin and his
followers for importing the unrepublican conception of freedom as
non-interference into this century. ' Berlin described two conceptions of liberty: negative liberty existed in the absence of interference or the threat of interference. Positive liberty required the
"agent to take an active part in gaining control or mastery over themselves." 37 Berlin associated the former type of liberty with the great
English and French figures in philosophy: Bentham, Hobbes, and
Mill; Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Constant; and Americans such
as Thomas Paine. The positive form of liberty Berlin painted in
darker colors as being susceptible to fanaticism."
Pettit finds that "the negative-positive distinction has served us
ill in political thought" because it posits only two ways of understanding liberty and ignores at least one further possibility." Freedom as
non-domination shares elements of both negative (the notion of absence) and positive (the notion of master) liberty, but highlights the
difference between dominance (or mastery) and interference that
Pettit believes is crucial to republicanism and that Berlin's taxonomy
obscures.4

34

Seeid. at38.

35

See id. at 44-45.

See id. at 17.
37 Id. at 17; see also IsAIH BERUN, FoUR ESSAYS ON LIBERIY 130-31 (1969)
(defining negative liberty as "the extent to which no [one] interferes with my activity" and positive liberty as "the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master").
3

39

40

See PETIrr, supranote 10, at 18.
Id.
See id. at 22.
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B. PhilosophicalPremises
Domination and interference are not identical concepts, although they can overlap. One can be dominated without being interfered with, or interfered with without being dominated. Employing a second republican theme of "liberty versus slavery," Pettit
illustrates the distinction with the classic republican imagery of master and servant. 1 A servant is subject to the will of the master, but
the master may not interfere with the servant's actual choices. The
master may be kind, for example, or the servant clever enough to be
able to get away with whatever the servant wants. Conversely, one
may not be a servant of another but another party-Pettit uses the
example of a government agency-may have the ability to interfere
with the person's choices. 2 If that interference is in accordance with
the person's own desires, or if the performance of that party is policed by another, or if the person has equal power to challenge the
interference, then there is no domination. In other words, the difference between interference and domination is that under the latter conception, the dominator has an arbitrary ability to interfere,
while under the former the potential dominator is restricted, either
by the subject's ability to contest the interference or in some other
manner. Pettit summarizes the difference this wayDomination can occur without interference, because it requires
only that someone have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in
your affairs; no one need actually interfere. Interference can occur without domination, because interference need not involve
the exercise of a capacity for arbitrary interference,
only the ex43
ercise of a much more constrained ability.
Freedom as non-domination is not a positive conception, like
Berlin's positive liberty, because it stresses removing mastery by others, not furthering self-mastery." The central republican thinkers,
Pettit argues, had this sense of arbitrary interference in mind when
arguing for liberty. Drawing on the works of Paine, Harrington, and
others, Pettit concludes that "the writers who identify with the broad
republican tradition of thinking take liberty to be defined by a status
in which the evils associated with interference are avoided rather
than by access to the instruments of democratic control."4 ' Therefore, any form of government, in theory, would be suitable to further
41

Seeid. at31.

42

Seid. at23.

43

Id.
See PE=l-r, supra note 10, at 31.
Id. at 30.

44
45
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and protect republican principles.4 Although a more positive emphasis on direct or representative democracy, derived from Rousseau, became a characteristic feature of later republican thought,
Pettit warns against a facile equation of republicanism with populism.4 7 This position places Pettit at odds with some new republicans,

such as Michelman, who see self-government as the crucial feature of
the republican tradition, as well as with the older republicans, who
conceived citizen identity as closely tied with the larger public life of
the polity."
Non-domination is preferable to non-interference because of
Nonthe former's institutional and political implications.
interference values choice, but is not concerned with whether that
choice may be dominated by another. So long as there is no actual
or threatened coercion, the principle of non-interference is satisfied.
Thus, freedom as non-interference does not take into account political or economic structures that constrict individual choice if those
choices are not actually being interfered with. Freedom as nondomination, however, has more to say to these concerns, and will be
more active in reducing impediments to non-dominated choices. 9
To complete his conception of non-domination, and to answer
some challenges he anticipates to his view, Pettit supplements the
account of freedom as non-domination with some definitions. Arbitrariness is a critical term in Pettit's vocabulary. An act is arbitrary
when "it is subject just to the arbitriuni, the decision or judgment, of
the agent; the agent was in a position to choose it or not choose it, at
their pleasure."'o He notes that domination may be more or less intense, in the level of dominance one enjoys over another, and may
be more or less extensive, in the range of choices that are subject to
domination." The emphasis, therefore, is on the controls, or lack
See id. Although monarchy may seem to be the antithesis of republicanism,
anti-monarchism never became a dominant feature of the tradition, in part because
the republican writers considered representative or democratic government to be
only one possible method of protecting liberty, but not liberty itself. See id. Montesquieu thought that the British constitutional monarchy provided the best protections for liberty. See id. at 41.
4 See id. at 30 ("To think of the republican tradition as populist, as of course
many have done, would be to sustain the very dichotomy that has rendered the republican ideal invisible."); see also Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican
Government?, 65 U. COLo. L. Rzv. 709, 718 (1994) (arguing against "radical simplicities" that reduce understanding of republicanism to direct democracy).
48 SeeMichelman, supra note 10, at 40. See generally
Kahn, supra note 17.
49 SePErlrT,supranote 10, at 25.
60 Id. at 55.
5' See id. at 57-58.
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thereof, that govern the potential dominator's actions, not on the
substantive results achieved by the domination.
An act is non-arbitrary, therefore, to the extent that it tracks the
interests of those subject to it. Pettit terms the restraint upon arbitrary action available to those affected by the action "contestability.""5
Pettit argues that no one can consent to be dominated, and so the
existence of consent is irrelevant to whether one party is dominating
another.54 Thus, Pettit notes, populism and freedom of contract are
illegitimate offshoots from the republican tradition, because they
rely on the false assumption that a person or group of persons can
consent to be dominated by another person or group either through
electoral victory or by entering into a contract that places one at the
mercy of another. 55 Pettit prefers, therefore, to speak of contestability rather than consent. An act will not be arbitrary so far as those
subject to the act are able to contest it, although they need not actually do so. A republican state requires certain preconditions of contestability to ensure that the decisionmaking process tracks the interests of those affected by the decision. Potential for contestation
must exist, as well as channels to guide that contestation. Finally, a
forum in which to voice the arguments contesting the action or decision must exist."
Pettit closes his philosophical analysis by tying the republican
ideal to contemporary political theory. The author argues that the
republican ideal of non-domination, although originally restricted to
a small class of propertied males, can be expanded to a modem pluralistic state. Like some versions of modem liberalism, such as that
espoused by Ronald Dworkin, non-domination represents a "neutral"
ideal that different groups, with varying conceptions of the good, will
find satisfactory. 57 Non-domination is an egalitarian idea separate
from particular conceptions of the good and that nevertheless establishes the principle that each will be treated as one, and none as
In response to the traditional republican idea
more than one.
(carried forward by some modem communitarians) that neutral val52

See id.

Id. at 61.
See id. at62.
55 See PzTrr, supra note 10, at 62.
SSee id. at 183-85.
17 See id. at 96; see also RONAm DwoRIuN, A MATrIR or Pimcn'
191 (1985)
(stating liberalism posits a neutral ideal of equality that is "independent of any particular conception of the good life"). But see SANDEL, supra note 4, at 8-19
(criticizing such an approach).
W SmPrrr, supra note 10, at 110.
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ues cannot claim the allegiance of disparate groups, Pettit claims
that such arguments offer a counsel of "despair" and "ignorance"
that essentially surrenders the idea of a functioning pluralist society.
However, Pettit is not ready to concede that republicanism is incompatible with every form of communitarianism. Non-domination
is a common good in that it can be enjoyed only in relation to other
individuals and cannot be enjoyed alone.60 Legal and social arrangements must be in place to preserve and further nondomination. These arrangements-which are of interest to the entire community-if not completely random, will work on the basis of
what Pettit calls "markers" that classify individuals according to a set
of characteristics. Thus, furthering non-domination for one individual will further non-domination for the communities of individuals
who share those characteristics. 6 '
II

Having recovered republicanism for contemporary debate and
defined its key features, Pettit turns to describing what a contemporary republican society might look like. Although Pettit does not use
the terms, his republican constitution would function as both a
framework for protecting non-domination and as a constraint upon
those institutions, public or private, that could dominate. The republicanism Pettit describes retains some of its historical features,
particularly its recognition that the institutions meant to preserve
freedom may, if given enough power, function as dominating forces
themselves. To counter that threat, Pettit devotes a chapter to
"Checking the Republic," in which he sets forth an elaborate system
of "sanctions"6 and "screens"" to prevent arrangements meant to
further non-domination from themselves dominating. The republican position approaches the design of institutions with the assumption that persons in power are corruptible although not in fact invariably corrupt. Republican institutions must be designed to take

69

See id. at 96-97.

60 See id. at 122.
61 Seeid. at 123.
2 See genera/ly Larry Kramer,
tdelity to History-and Through It, 65 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 1627, 1631 (1997).
63 Prr,
supranote 10, at 212-13 (describing "sanctions" as measures that make
some options more or less attractive than if the sanctions had not been in place).
Id. at 214 (describing "screens" as measures that aid in recruiting to certain
tasks persons inclined to act in socially valuable ways).
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both possibilities of corruption and non-corruption into account.6
The goal that should guide the republican policymaker should by
now be obvious: to further non-domination in whatever form.
A.

GeneralPrinciples

Pettit concludes that the principle of non-domination permits
republicans to be politically optimistic and socially radical. Republicans will have less skepticism about the role of the state because
"[republicans] do not view state action, provided it is properly constrained, as an inherent affront to liberty as itself a form of domination."6 Their greater radicalism arises from their intolerance at any
form of domination, even benign forms. The republican ideal does
have its limits however. Because non-dominating government can, if
too large, itself become dominating, the range of independent powers trusted to such a government must remain limited. Nondomination is not the "sort of monstrous ideal" that requires continual government growth to exist.6' Pettit proceeds to consider nondomination in relation to five general areas of state policy: external
defense, internal protection, personal independence, economic
prosperity, and public life. While generally not concrete proposals,
65
Pettit provides a sketch of the course a republican state may take.
Whichever the area, a republican society will keep government
power as close to the people affected by that power as possible. A
number of structures can accomplish this goal, such as establishing a
federal system or bicameral legislature. 69 The argument here is abbreviated, and Pettit could have elaborated further upon the connections he discerns between the historical suspicion of government
power in the republican tradition (and hence the eagerness of republicans for small governments closely bound to the people) and
his contention that republicans are not necessarily hostile to state
power.
The republican emphasis on non-domination, when applied to
the criminal law, would emphasize correcting the arbitrary interference caused by the criminal actor upon the victim. Thus, a republican criminal law would concentrate on compensating the victim and
society for the decrease in non-domination caused by the offense
and on limiting the potential of law enforcement officers from beSe id. at 211.
6
67

69

Id. at 148.
See id. at 150.
See id. at 147-70.
See PErT, supra note 10, at 178-79.
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coming agents of dominadon--such as in minority communities,
perhaps. Typical republican sanctions might include restitution or
reparations, and a reassurance that the offender will no longer be a
threat.7
More controversially, perhaps, Pettit argues that the principle of
non-domination may require granting basic entitlements as a matter
of right to those citizens who lack the resources or faculties to enjoy
non-domination unaided. These entitlements, Pettit argues, should
be independent of the political process and of the arbitrary or capricious decisions of administrators." Pettit correctly notes that the republican tradition, generally, had little difficulty with schemes of
taxation to reduce luxury or the power of the wealthy to corrupt the
political process." Montesquieu, for example, argued that republican government required "mediocrity" of fortunes.74 Modem republicans also have argued that republican principles are compatible
with schemes of wealth redistribution, drawing on the writings of the
Anti-Federalists. 7 Pettit does not go as far as some of the modem
republicans, however, and contends that non-domination requires
only structural equality, not material equality.
Pettit's proposal, however, contravenes some of his operating
premises. The republican concern was to reduce the power of
wealthy elite who could corrupt the state, not necessarily to raise
those thought dependent (for example, due to a lack of property) to
independent status. Pettit approaches the problem of corruption
from the opposite direction, by increasing non-domination for those
who have little. While there may not be a conceptual difficulty with
treating the problem of corruption this way, Pettit does not present a
70
1

See id. at 154-57.

See id. at 156-57. See generay Shirley Woodward, Debt to Society: A Communitar-

ian Approach to CtiminalAntiprofitLaws, 85 GEo. LJ. 455 (1997).
See PErrr, supranote 10, at 162-63.
73 See McGiniss, supra note 16, at 1769 (discussing Madison's conception
of taxadon of the wealthy).
74 See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 329,
358-59 & n.162 (1996) (expounding on the republican need for equality in wealth).
75 See CASS R. SUNSEinN, THE PARTIAL CONSTmmON 138 (1993)
(arguing republicans believed that basic needs should be provided to all citizens through taxation);
Maijorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and
the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 135 (1994) (arguing that wealth promotes participation in society). See generalyAkhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican
Theory ofMinimal Entitlements, 13 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1990). See also Letters of
Centin4 I, in THE ANT-FEDERALISr, supra note 25, at 16 (stating "republican, or free
form of government, can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous and
where property is pretty evenly divided').
76 SePerrr, supranote 10, at 117.
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full argument as to why a system of absolute entitlements could not
also corrupt the political process. Those required to support such a
system through contributions of wealth may feel themselves subject
to arbitrary controls. Granting entitlements may not be in accord
with their interests and may not be contestable (in Pettit's sense) if
such a system is conceived as a constitutional guarantee. Thus, those
affected may not be able to give effective voice to their concerns.
Strangely, Pettit recognizes this concern as motivating the partisans
for American independence, who saw the colonists as subject to taxation by a government over which they had no control, but does not
make the connection with an entitlements guarantee."
Republicans resorted to methods like social pressures to support charities, or the common implementation of luxury or sumptuary taxes to reduce the corrupting privileges of wealth. 78 These were
political measures, however, reflecting the republican belief that
property was not an absolute right or constitutional guarantee. 79
Property was an instrumental good that enabled its holders to cultivate virtue and tied persons to their communities. 80 Understood in
this way, we can satisfy Pettit's concern that those who are vulnerable
to domination be given the means to escape it, and we can be more
faithful to republican principles by placing non-arbitrary restrictions
on how that property is used.8'
Further, granting entitlements a protected status outside of
normal political processes undercuts the reliance Pettit places upon
deliberative processes to debate matters of common good in order to
find a just solution, the outlines of which may change over time.
Placing certain subjects beyond discussion by means of constitutional
guarantee grants those benefiting from those subjects a freedom not
granted to others not so protected. Indeed, it allows those who
benefit from such a system to escape its constraints.'
Non-domination, therefore, may not be the best way to support
Pettit's argument for minimum entitlements. An alternative argu77
78
79

See id. at 33.
See Rose, supra note 74, at 361.
See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause

and the PoliticalProcess, 95 CoLUM. L. Rzv. 782, 783 (1995) (discussing the dominance of republican property beliefs as the pertinent history for the Takings
Clause).
so See Suzanna Sherry, "Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty," 78 MIwN. L. REv.
61, 71 (1993) (discussing the connection between property and sense of community).
See id. at 75-77.
See PErr, supranote 10, at 200.
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ment found in the republican tradition, based upon the notion of
"natural rights," is perhaps a better foundation. Such an argument
would base entitlements on rights inherent in every individual, and
the government's responsibility to aid in the enjoyment of those
rights. Pettit, however, rejects that possibility and claims the republican language of rights was of "rhetorical significance" only. 3 However, at least some republicans upon whom Pettit relies, such as
Madison or James Wilson, had a belief in the existence of natural
rights." Indeed, it is Pettit's villain, Jeremy Bentham, who called the
belief in natural rights "nonsense upon stilts."o
B. Deliberationand Virtue
In the closing chapters, Pettit reintegrates his two guiding terms
of republican discourse, deliberation and the notions of civic virtue,
into a reformulated republicanism. He returns to the notion of contestability as a basis for non-domination in the republican
M The
"deliberative" republic.8
deliberative republic contains within
itself the methods through which the interests of all parties, especially those of minority communities, can be given voice. Pettit
adopts the model developed by Sunstein and Quentin Skinner,
within which "citizens have equal claims and powers, public matters
are decided by deliberation on the basis of considerations that have
common appeal ... and agreement serves as a regulative ideal as to
how things should be decided ... ." Implicit in this view is the belief that representatives will deliberate not on the basis of narrow
motives, nor even on the interests of their constituents, but rather in
light of the common good.
In outlining his vision of the deliberative republic, Pettit returns
to the place of group rights. His model would require inclusionary
electoral representation, based upon group characteristics, to further
the non-domination of minority and other disadvantaged groups,
such as indigenous peoples. A republican polity, he argues, cannot
83

See id. at 101.

See Stephen A. Conrad, The Rhetorical Constitution of "CivilSociety' at the Founding: One Lawyer's Anxious Vision, 72 IND. L.J. 335, 335-38 (1997) (outlining James
Wilson's belief in natural rights).
2 THE WoRmS OF JEREMY BENrHAM 501 (John Bowring ed., 1962); see also
McGinnis, supra note 16, at 1774-75 (arguing republicans believed in natural rights
and that such a belief was in accord with pluralism).
86
SeePETrrr, supranote 10, at 187.
Id. at 189. See generally SuNFrIxN, supra note 75. See also QUENTIN
SKINNER,

REASON AND RHETORIC INTHE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 15-16 (1996). But see McGinnis,
supra note 16, at 1778-81 (criticizing the Sunstein model).

1997]

BOOK REVIEW

755

be fully deliberative unless all groups are heard and able to participate. Otherwise, some groups are at risk of subjection to the arbitrary decisions of other groups, especially the majority. Republican
institutions, therefore, must be representative of the various groups
within the society."
This model, Pettit argues, differs from the "interest-group pluralism" criticized by Sunstein as an alternative to republicanism.
Simply put, the interest-group model is the "invisible-hand" applied
to politics; each group seeking its own private interests will result in a
general public good." These groups are not seeking to find a separate "public good;" instead, the model stresses compromise and bargaining over an agreeable mix of private goods.' Republicanism rejects that mode, even if the pluralists are correct that persons know,
and can act in furtherance of, their private interests. Pettit writes,
"To make naked preference into the motor of social life is to expose
all weakly placed individuals to the naked preferences of the
stronger," or to expose them to the arbitrary will of majorities.9 ' The
invisible hand model, which may work for market transactions involving large numbers of buyers and sellers constantly entering and leaving the market, is not the proper model, from the republican view,
for other parts of political life.
Pettit recasts the republican concern for virtue as the need for
"civility." Although the law cannot inspire civility, republican regimes require a basis in widespread civility, which will encompass
both generally-accepted norms of behavior, as well as specific norms
for those within certain groups or roles.9 These norms will support
the laws insofar as the laws themselves support republican principles;
if the two are in congruence, the citizens will be more inclined to
obey the laws and to enjoy a higher degree of non-domination. Internalizing these republican principles will enable individuals to
identify with others and with the good of society as a whole. 3
The state cannot command, however, an increase in civility
when a society has lost it; the supply of "social capital" must derive

W See PETrrr, supra note 10, at 191; see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican

Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1530 (1992)
("Representatives of all interests potentially affected by a government action must
have meaningful opportunities to engage in discussion about the action").
See PEr, supranote 10, at 204-05.
W SeSunstein,
e
supra note 11, at 32.
91 See PETT, supra note 10, at 205.
"

See id. at 246-51.
See id. at 260.
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from nonrepublican institutions." Yet, because of Pettit's claim that
non-domination must be a neutral good that can claim the allegiance of those with more particularized concepts of the good, he
refrains from describing these nonrepublican (or pre-republican)
institutions in detail. A look at the republican tradition, however,
will reveal two significant pillars of republican virtue: religion and
the family."' Indeed, in reviewing the history of republican thought,
Pettit ignores that in the ancient and some modem republics, social,
political, and religious functions were closely tied together and collectively formed the republic's identity."
Pettit's muting of "virtue" into "civility," therefore, is of more
than semantic importance. Republican virtue was based upon an
"unquestioned hierarchy of values" that governed individual and
social behavior." A reluctance to particularize the requirements of republican virtue beyond the neutral ideal of non-domination eliminates the ability of a republican state to discriminate between
virtuous and nonvirtuous behavior." Republican emphasis, however,
upon deliberation in the pursuit of virtue would seem to require not
only that republican citizens seek virtue, but also that a republican
state should actively dissuade vice." In Pettit's language, a state that
could determine the best interests of citizens, even if the citizens
themselves could not, should be able to dominate their choices. The
language of shame and dishonor, for example, is omitted from Pettit's account. Also missing from Pettit's republicanism is a theory of
human nature that would explain why we should value nondomination over and above the other elements that made up the
classical republican conception of human nature and political society. In effect, Pettit is attempting to attain liberal ends (individual
See id. at 254.
9 See Frohnen, supra note 15, at 946-47 (arguing that the founding generation
considered republican principles derived from religious faith and family); John
Witte, Jr., The EssentialRights and Liberties of Religion in the American ConstitutionalExperiment, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 385-87 (1996) (concluding republican thinkers regarded religious belief essential to a virtuous republic and that it ought to be
publicly supported).
See CarlJ. Friedrich, The Concept of Community in the History of Politicaland
Legal
Philosophy,in 2 NoMos 3, 5-6 (CarlJ. Friedrich ed., 1959).
0 See Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 131, 138-40 (1995) (arguing that moral skepticism and egalitarianism
of modem republicans is fundamentally at odds with traditional republican theory).
98 See id. at 141.
" See Steven G. Gey, The UnfortunateRevival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA.
L.
REv. 801, 809 (1993) (arguing modem republicans do not fully define republican
virtue and that classical republican virtue would not condone neutrality among
competing conceptions of the good life).
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freedom and value-neutrality) through the republican language of
freedom, virtue, and deliberation.
III
Traditional republicanism was about limits. Republicans believed there were limits to human goodness, to government's ability
to protect freedom, in the abilities of people to resist temptation,
and even limits to the physical territory of a republic.0" Pettit offers a
vigorous and thoughtful reconception of the republican tradition
and demonstrates that the republican tradition can be just as much
about opportunities as about limits. Pettit makes a convincing case
that furthering non-domination as a "dynamic" ideal not tied to particular institutional arrangements will allow flexibility and will protect a comfortable amount of personal and social liberty.'0 ' Pettit's
proposals contrast favorably with certain trends in modem liberalism, such as its obsession with fixing legal rights and thus freezing
political and legal development in light of more flexible principles.'
likewise, Pettit's argument that the republican ideal of nondomination is both individual and communitarian is a needed corrective to the oftentimes sterile debate between liberals and communitarians.
As further support, Pettit might have discussed the institutional
embodiments of republicanism. For example, recent scholarly work
has demonstrated the republican principles supporting institutions
such as the colonial and state militias.' Moreover, aside from passing references to the need to make juries more representative of the
population, there is no analysis of the role the common-law jury
100 See Paul Finkelman, Antifederalists: The Loyal Opposition and the American Constitution, 70 CoRNEL.L L. Rxv. 182, 202 (1984) (discussing the need for limits on federal government); Nedelsky, supra note 24, at 345. For example, at least some republicans held up the example of the Roman Empire as a cautionary example of
expanding a republic too widely. See Letters of Brutus, I, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 25, at 113.
11 See PErrrr, supra note 10, at 146.
10 SeJohn Gray, Autonomy Is Not the Only Good, TiMEs Lrr. Supp.,
at 30 (June 13,
1997) (book review).
103 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE LJ.
1131, 1170-71 (1992) (describing militia as local institution serving popular values);
Nelson Lund, The Past andFuture of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REv. 1, 35
(1996) (recounting republican influences in debates over the Second Amendment); Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, BringingForward the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or PrecedentStand in the Way? 75 N.C. L. REv. 781,
813 (1997) (arguing classical republican rhetoric accords significant role for citizen
militias).
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played in developing republican principles.'" The jury was a critical
element in revolutionary-era republican theory and language. It
embodied the deliberative process of true citizenship and the cultivation of civic virtue.'O" The jury was thought valuable to republican
government for enshrining these principles, despite occasional aberrant or irrational decisions in particular cases.106
Of course, efforts to compress any complex tradition of thought
risks the dangers of reductionism and flattening important nuances.
Indeed, some scholars have argued that "republicanism" itself is largely a modern construct.'" While hostility to arbitrary control is important, it must be considered along with the other
elements of the tradition.
The place of group rights, for example, has an awkward place in
the republican tradition.1' 9 Pettit's measured approval of extreme
autonomy, or even secession for cultural or other minority groups,
sidesteps the examples the republicans had before them in emphasizing the importance of a unified civic culture."0 While some republicans certainly were proponents of localism, out of a desire to protect localities from the power of central authorities, this conception
does not translate well into Pettit's multicultural republican vision, at
least without further discussion of the structural safeguards that
would protect against domination. The localism contained in the
republican tradition is a remnant of the "ancient constitutionalism,"
which was described by Carol Rose and was based on granting sub104

See Prr,

supra note 10, at 192-93; see also Nedelsky, supra note 24, at 345

(demonstrating Anti-Federalist belief in value ofjury system); Note, The Value of the
Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1421, 1436-37 (1997) (exploring republican roots of
importance ofjuries to democratic government).
05 See Value of the CivilJury, supra note 104, at 1440; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The
Idea of a Useable Past, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 601, 607 (1995) (listing the right to ajury
trial as a precondition for political liberty in republican thought).
106 See Value of the CivilJury, supra
note 104, at 1437.
107 See generay WilliamJ. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins
of State Power in
America, 45 HAsniNs L.J. 1061 n.4 (1994).
108 See generally THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRrr OF MODuRN REPUBLICANSM (1988);
Frohnen, supra note 15, at 938 (claiming modem republicanism is based on a misunderstanding of founding principles).
109 See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundariesof Race: Political Geography in
LegalAnalysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1841 (1994); Cynthia V. Ward, The Limits of "Liberal
Republicanism": Why Group-Based Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don't Mix, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 581 (1991). But see Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1589 (arguing for
group representation to correct material and social inequality).
n1 See PET=iT, supra note 10, at 199-200. The author writes, "At the limit, the
ideal of non-domination may require in relevant cases that [a minority group is]
allowed to secede from the state, establishing a separate territory or at least a separate jurisdiction; that possibility has to be kept firmly on the horizon." Id. at 199.
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stantive rights or privileges, based in immemorial custom or usage,
to particular groups within the larger community."' This localism
also protected the "voice" and "exit" options of individuals and their
communities.Y
This strand of the republican tradition, although admired by
Pettit, does not conform completely to Pettit's principle." Granting
substantive privileges or benefits to some groups over others presents
the same difficulty for Pettit as granting entitlements: it removes
from the deliberative process some parts of political life that would
otherwise be open to discussion. The republican ideal of the citizen
devoted to the common good loses its effectiveness when citizens can
exchange that common good for the good of a particular group, or
even withdraw from considering the common good altogether. Indeed, Pettit's theory contains traces of the "interest-group pluralism"
that he condemns, because his model implies that groups can withhold their participation in the republican civic culture until they are
granted political concessions.
Suzanna Sherry has criticized the understanding of pluralism
that she finds characteristic in modem republican writing.' 4 She argues that because the new republicans do not share the conception,
held by earlier republicans, of a unified cultural community seeking
absolute moral norms, their liberal epistemology invariably leads
them to create new rights intended to protect minority or dissenting
groups. While Pettit disavows the language of rights in an effort to
avoid the problem Sherry identifies, his use of non-domination as a
surrogate for group rights encounters the same difficulty. As Sherry
writes, "[t] hese new rights, however, are themselves in conflict with a
republican political community since they are likely to lead to exclusion and balkanization.""s Similarly, Cynthia Ward has stated that
the "communo-pathic" features of liberalism and its attachment to a
political outlook alienate citizens from the state."'
I See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: AntiFederalismfrom the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74
(1989).
11 See id. at 96-97.
11 See Pzrrrr, supranote
10, at 199.
14 See Sherry, supra note 97, at 138-40 (arguing that moral skepticism
and egalitarianism of modem republicans is fundamentally at odds with traditional republican theory).
15 Id. at 143; see also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented
Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REv. 331,
357 (1994) (arguing new republicans do not distinguish correct from incorrect
value judgments).
115 See Ford, supra note 109, at 1889 (noting that the republican state that unites
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Insofar as Pettit argues for secession from a political community
and forming a subunit within the larger political entity, it might be
compatible with some forms of republican federalism." The right to
"exit" has long been a part of republican, and especially American,
political tradition. However, insofar as he argues for complete separation from a larger political community, he undermines his republican vision. Granting rights of secession to discrete groups eviscerates the attraction of non-domination as a neutral ideal applicable to
different groups. If, after participating in the deliberative process
and being granted concessions to protect the group's identity such
as proportional representation," 8 a particular group is still permitted
to leave the republican polity, what incentive is there to engage in
the deliberative process at all? If a group has the ability to secede
from the larger polity, there is little incentive to cultivate civic virtue
among members of that group and little incentive for members of
other groups to accommodate the needs of the minorities." While
the initial move toward recognizing group rights was based in a desire to protect those groups from discrimination (or domination),
that desire is rooted in a liberal understanding of political community. Perhaps what is needed is a stronger sense of common identity
than Pettit's theory seems to allow.

all persons in collective process to discover common good has no room for
"organized disadvantaged groups as separate political entities"); Ward, supra note
109, at 583.
17 See genera//yJoseph P. Viteritti, Municipal
Home Rule and the Conditions ofJustifiableSecassion, 23 FRDHAM URIL.J. 1 (1995).
118 &e P rr, supra note 10, at 191.
1
See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secesion, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 633,
634-35 (1991) (arguing secession creates instability for constitutional government).

